Economic Effect on Civility: Polemic Paper
[By]: Jason Krug
[Class]: POL365: Political Behavior
[Author]:Jason Krug
[Term]: Fall, 2011
[Class]: POL365: Political Behavior
[Author]:Jason Krug
[Term]: Fall, 2011
Abstract
This research has been complied in order to further the argument that civility has a positive relationship with economic conditions in a polemic format. Economic conditions serve as an independent variable, thus adding to the research in civility and resource distribution.
Introduction
Politics is frequently defined as the distribution of scarce resources. Though these resources have a greater scope than physical resources alone, my central question is: If there is less economic resource to be distributed will the civility of political discourse and action, especially between the decision makers in the United States Congress, lessen? Answering these questions could aid in a greater understanding of how resources are allocated, and why politics are perceived as negative. It is important to note that for working purposes, civility is defined much like medical tolerance. In short, civility in this thesis and research is viewed as the absence of hostility.
Most literature on United States politics focuses on civility as the independent variable, and makes claims that it greatly affects those that are being campaigned to or those that are being represented in decision making. There is little focus on the decision makers in action, and most focus is given to campaign politics. There are additional claims in international politics that economic interdependence, thus a balance of power, results in a more peaceful world, a world with less war and armed conflict. While in international politics, there are other elements that aid the world in being more peaceful, it is important to note that economics has a large barring on the other two points of triangulating peace.
In order to convey a positive relationship between economic conditions and civility I will first establish the nature of politics being the distribution of scarce resources with historical definitions, I will then use historical context, and reference empirical study to show that if economic resources are made more scarce then there is more at stake, and I will finally reference empirical study, and use historical context to make the claim that if there is more at stake, people are less likely to be civil. If people are less likely to be civil by these means, then a positive relationship can be drawn between economic conditions and civility in U.S. Congressional politics.
Methodology
I will use a polemic format to refute claims against my thesis and provide sources to a logic flow chart that establishes my claims. It is important to note that though this may not seem to be the most conventional research format it is done in a widely accepted fashion. This format is as legitimate as formulating and interpreting hard data.
I will utilize a table of my arguments and their support, against what retorts there may be and what are currently in the field of research and sight their support. This aids in structuring the format of the paper, which helps mitigate making logical fallacies or blatantly forgetting to mention important steps in showing the superiority of my claims, as well as aids the lay-reader in interpreting the arguments. This is also aided by using my arguments section solely to establish my claims and retaining the literature review, which is not normally part of a polemic format, so that I will not have to explain the background of the argument as I am giving it.
Figure 1
Literature Review and Summary
In seeking to define politics and political organizations there are many variables, but among them are claims that resources sharing being part of politics are among them (see Allen; and Bronston). There is also mention that politics is self-serving, and that should contribute toward a definition, but that is dismissed by the authors making claim that all behavior can be argued to serve at least some self-interest. Allen and Bronston continue at length about the systematic nature of political organization, and that there are nuances in the resource allocation definition of politics. They make claim that there is a difference between normal business and political action. Other arguments are made mention of: such as that government and political action are interference in economic life (see Downs). These arguments are based off of theories that the private sector is self-regulating. It should be noted, in order not to misconstrued Downs’ literature, that he makes mention that this flies in the face of many sub-field of economics.
As aforementioned, several authors have researched civility in relation to political behavior, but have often used civility as the independent variable (see Ansolabehere; Lau). Rarely is it discussed in current literature on civility where it results from, and what conditions feed into how civil a person or group of people are. There is also little discussion of civility between decision makers when they are in office, the large focus is on electoral politics affecting the political behavior of the electorate (see Brooks; Geer).
While there is literature about resource scarcity affecting distribution justice (see Tetlock; Skitka), there is again little claim that civility is victim to economic conditions. Though it should be mentioned that Tetlock’s, and Skitka’s literature does put focus on “allocators experienc[ing] anger toward claimants”, it seems to tip-toe around the issue of the allocators civility, among each other. A lot of what would be civility discussion is chalked up to “abstract distributive norms” which makes the claim that civility is largely dependent upon cultural ties.
Some literature recognizes the conflict in times of scarce resources, is a lessening in civility and it has adverse effects (see Poon; Tjosvold). This literature seemed to also create, or at the very least hope for, an idealized world, wherein conflict was useful due to cooperation that could occur. There was also an idealized claim that open-minded discussion could result in a productive discourse of opposing view-points. While this scholarly article discusses conflict, in the sense of groups opposing each other for claim to scarce resources, much like I would be discussing incivility, historical claims go against the notion that the very same groups would work collaboratively.
Scholarly accounts of historical resource allocation are imperative to this research, as they will show a precedent as to the relationship between civility and resource scarcity. Accounting clashes and politics over resources, particularly water resource, in the Jordan region demonstrates the incivility that follows resource scarcity (see Lowi). Water resource being of import as it leads to means of travel, trade, public health, etc. violence, political rhetoric, and world politics have been centered around the distribution of just this particular river region. Lowi also makes claims that intervention from other countries and organizations haven’t been very effective, as they have nibbled at the edges of the larger cultural and national security concerns.
In international politics there are the three elements of Kantian peace, being International Organizations, Democracy, and Economic Interdependence (see Russett; Oneal). It is proposed that peace is achieved because when one of the elements falters the others will aid in maintaining stability. This is a further development from the Democratic Peace Theory, which claims that democratic societies remain at peace with one another and abroad due to the virtues of democracy (see Russett; Oneal).
Arguments
First and foremost, it is essential to prove that politics is the allocation of resources, or else economic conditions would have no great bearing on the civility with in them, as no arguments or competition would be centered around the distribution. I do not think it an over step to say that governments, especially democratic government, form in order to meet the needs of the people unified within them. I do not think it is a gross logical leap to say that governments, and of course the decision makers within them, are the primary actors in politics. With this I will then argue that as the politics of the Jordan show, it is the job of government, even those that are not democratic, to allocate what resources they have (or desire) and that in many cases these resources are scarce. If they weren’t scarce then, people would not have to formulate a presiding structure, government or even international organizations, to allocate the resources among them. This is further reinforced by scholarly works, such as that from Bronstron and Robert. As there micro-ed example of individual organizations being categorized as political and non-political accepts the notion that resource allocation, what they call resource sharing systems, is substantial part of what defines a political organization.
Arguments against politics being the distribution of scarce resources were hard to find, which should be a statement in itself, but as this is a polemic piece I pull an argument mentioned in Downs piece. This argument follows the logic of the private-sector regulating itself, claiming that government and political action only interfere with the allocation of resources. This claim protests that the private sector manages resource distribution, and the decision behind it, so the actors in politics would have no need to become hostile or uncivil in the case that economic conditions are poor. I would refute this point as Downs does, in democracies people give authority to their government, which is conducted in a political nature, to make resource allocations, and so many sub-fields of economics are based as such. The private sector either sees benefit in giving up this power to a system allocation of what Downs calls welfare, or the private sector succumbs to public demand that its resources be shared.
My second point is that scarcity creates competition. One would be hard pressed to say that incivility is breed outside of a competitive arena. The basis for my argument is simple, if there is less to go around then people who equal seek to acquire resource will compete for it. This can be either armed conflict or negotiation. Though it is easy to identify war and armed conflict as incivility, language, and tactic in negotiation can also be identified as incivility. Admittedly, slinging curse words is not the same as sling missiles, but this does fit within the confines of the medical definition of tolerance i.e. the lack of hostility. This of course is supported by historical examples of conflict in the Jordan region over water conflict, if countries cannot all draw from rivers in harmony, then armed conflict will proceed, or dominance will be asserted in the world stage, which can be perceived as threats of assault. Though this is a broader example than that of the United States congress, I think it yet applies if scaled appropriately.
Against my argument stands the position that scarcity can create cooperation, not competition. If groups are acting cooperatively one can assume that lines have not been drawn in the sand and hostile words are not being said or hostile actions are not being committed. This would mean a more stringent definition of civility, then a lack of hostility, would have to be taken for the thesis to continue. The arguments for cooperation benefits come from Poon and Tjosvold’s literature of open-minded interaction. The support for this argument comes from the potential benefit in resource scarcity and that in combination with cooperation it could lead to more effective, and efficient resource distribution. I would say the key fault to this argument is that it could foster effective resource distribution, in the case that the powers at be do cooperate, which they are shown not to do historically or currently by the Downs literature.
Finally there is that competition, which spurs incivility, will supersede other values that could aid in retaining civility. This argument aids in tying what has been thus far a miss-match of macro-international politics examples to the mico-United States congressional level politics at hand. Economic interdependence of nations, the ability for them to operate without being overtaken in market aspects, being a large part of Oneal and Russett’s arguments for Kantian Peace between democracies supports the idea that democracies are not at some virtuous level of peacefulness that other regime types are not. This in turn supports my argument that competition supersedes other values. If a country cannot effectively contribute, and benefit a collective, it stands a greater chance of not staying at peace for much longer, and having hostility directed toward it, and directing hostility for others resources. If all countries enter such a state of economic disparity, resources will have uncivil relations taken over them. Whether that is the United States, using its superpower authority or a country using force to take resources, from a neighboring “weaker” country. Taking from that, the same could be said of any agency, or interest in the United States, and the congress people aligned with those interests.
Against my argument is the origin of Kantian Peace, the Democratic Peace Thesis. This is the sole claim that it is the virtues of democracies not to go to war with one another, because of shared values. It also asserts that it is hard to go to war in a democracy, and gaining support against a country that has leaders that are presumed to be elected legitimately is difficult (see Oneal; Russett). To refute this argument I will point out the additions made in a now more accepted version of the Kantian Peace. The first addition would be international organization, presiding to offer rules and guidance in the case of governments, and countries failure to cooperate. The second being already discussed at length, economic interdependence. If democracy and the values associated were enough to overcome incivility, and in the case of international politics armed conflict, then these additional categories wouldn’t be necessary to explain why democratic, who also happen to be the wealthiest, nations do not go to war against each other often.
Conclusion
Arguments in favor of my hypothesis hold in spite of the arguments presented against them. The process of putting counter arguments presented in current literature on the subject of civility and resource management stand as a rigorous test. I did have the luxury that much academia did not make direct attacks at my hypothesis in their works. The claim that there is a positive relationship between civility and economic conditions has a place with in both subjects of civility and resource distribution. As there is not much on the subject it was difficult to find sources that were useful to my discussion. In order to find relevant works, I had to accept fairly dated material that discussed civility or resource allocation at length. With that I think that it would be best in the future to collect data that would compare civility or perceived civility with economic conditions. It would help confirm my research, as really no such data collection exists at this time. With that I would like to again assert that following a logical flow chart, and testing it with counter point (see figure 1) there is a positive relationship between civility and economic conditions demonstrated.
References:
1. Allen, Robert, Mayes, Bronston. October 4, 1977. “Toward a Definition of Organizational Politics.” The academy of Management Review. 2(4): 672-678.
2. Ansolabehere, Stephen. 1994. “Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?” American Political Science Review 88(4):829–38
3. Downs, Anthony. April, 1957. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.” Journal of Political Economy. 65(2):135-150.
4. Lau, Richard R. 1982. “Negativity in Person Perception.” Political Behavior. 4(4):343–52
5. Lowi, Miriam. 2003. Water and Power: The politics of the scarce resource in the Jordan River basin. New York: Cambridge University Press.
6. Oneal, John, Russett, Bruce. 2001. Triangulation Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: Norton.
7. Poon, Margaret, Tjosvold, Dean. September, 1990. “Dealing with Scarce Resources: Open-Minded Interaction for Resolving Budget Conflicts.” Group Organization Management. 23(3): 237-255.
8. Skitka, Linda, Tetlock Philip. November, 1992. “Allocating Scarce Resources: A contingency model of distributive justice.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 28(6): 491-522.
This research has been complied in order to further the argument that civility has a positive relationship with economic conditions in a polemic format. Economic conditions serve as an independent variable, thus adding to the research in civility and resource distribution.
Introduction
Politics is frequently defined as the distribution of scarce resources. Though these resources have a greater scope than physical resources alone, my central question is: If there is less economic resource to be distributed will the civility of political discourse and action, especially between the decision makers in the United States Congress, lessen? Answering these questions could aid in a greater understanding of how resources are allocated, and why politics are perceived as negative. It is important to note that for working purposes, civility is defined much like medical tolerance. In short, civility in this thesis and research is viewed as the absence of hostility.
Most literature on United States politics focuses on civility as the independent variable, and makes claims that it greatly affects those that are being campaigned to or those that are being represented in decision making. There is little focus on the decision makers in action, and most focus is given to campaign politics. There are additional claims in international politics that economic interdependence, thus a balance of power, results in a more peaceful world, a world with less war and armed conflict. While in international politics, there are other elements that aid the world in being more peaceful, it is important to note that economics has a large barring on the other two points of triangulating peace.
In order to convey a positive relationship between economic conditions and civility I will first establish the nature of politics being the distribution of scarce resources with historical definitions, I will then use historical context, and reference empirical study to show that if economic resources are made more scarce then there is more at stake, and I will finally reference empirical study, and use historical context to make the claim that if there is more at stake, people are less likely to be civil. If people are less likely to be civil by these means, then a positive relationship can be drawn between economic conditions and civility in U.S. Congressional politics.
Methodology
I will use a polemic format to refute claims against my thesis and provide sources to a logic flow chart that establishes my claims. It is important to note that though this may not seem to be the most conventional research format it is done in a widely accepted fashion. This format is as legitimate as formulating and interpreting hard data.
I will utilize a table of my arguments and their support, against what retorts there may be and what are currently in the field of research and sight their support. This aids in structuring the format of the paper, which helps mitigate making logical fallacies or blatantly forgetting to mention important steps in showing the superiority of my claims, as well as aids the lay-reader in interpreting the arguments. This is also aided by using my arguments section solely to establish my claims and retaining the literature review, which is not normally part of a polemic format, so that I will not have to explain the background of the argument as I am giving it.
Figure 1
Literature Review and Summary
In seeking to define politics and political organizations there are many variables, but among them are claims that resources sharing being part of politics are among them (see Allen; and Bronston). There is also mention that politics is self-serving, and that should contribute toward a definition, but that is dismissed by the authors making claim that all behavior can be argued to serve at least some self-interest. Allen and Bronston continue at length about the systematic nature of political organization, and that there are nuances in the resource allocation definition of politics. They make claim that there is a difference between normal business and political action. Other arguments are made mention of: such as that government and political action are interference in economic life (see Downs). These arguments are based off of theories that the private sector is self-regulating. It should be noted, in order not to misconstrued Downs’ literature, that he makes mention that this flies in the face of many sub-field of economics.
As aforementioned, several authors have researched civility in relation to political behavior, but have often used civility as the independent variable (see Ansolabehere; Lau). Rarely is it discussed in current literature on civility where it results from, and what conditions feed into how civil a person or group of people are. There is also little discussion of civility between decision makers when they are in office, the large focus is on electoral politics affecting the political behavior of the electorate (see Brooks; Geer).
While there is literature about resource scarcity affecting distribution justice (see Tetlock; Skitka), there is again little claim that civility is victim to economic conditions. Though it should be mentioned that Tetlock’s, and Skitka’s literature does put focus on “allocators experienc[ing] anger toward claimants”, it seems to tip-toe around the issue of the allocators civility, among each other. A lot of what would be civility discussion is chalked up to “abstract distributive norms” which makes the claim that civility is largely dependent upon cultural ties.
Some literature recognizes the conflict in times of scarce resources, is a lessening in civility and it has adverse effects (see Poon; Tjosvold). This literature seemed to also create, or at the very least hope for, an idealized world, wherein conflict was useful due to cooperation that could occur. There was also an idealized claim that open-minded discussion could result in a productive discourse of opposing view-points. While this scholarly article discusses conflict, in the sense of groups opposing each other for claim to scarce resources, much like I would be discussing incivility, historical claims go against the notion that the very same groups would work collaboratively.
Scholarly accounts of historical resource allocation are imperative to this research, as they will show a precedent as to the relationship between civility and resource scarcity. Accounting clashes and politics over resources, particularly water resource, in the Jordan region demonstrates the incivility that follows resource scarcity (see Lowi). Water resource being of import as it leads to means of travel, trade, public health, etc. violence, political rhetoric, and world politics have been centered around the distribution of just this particular river region. Lowi also makes claims that intervention from other countries and organizations haven’t been very effective, as they have nibbled at the edges of the larger cultural and national security concerns.
In international politics there are the three elements of Kantian peace, being International Organizations, Democracy, and Economic Interdependence (see Russett; Oneal). It is proposed that peace is achieved because when one of the elements falters the others will aid in maintaining stability. This is a further development from the Democratic Peace Theory, which claims that democratic societies remain at peace with one another and abroad due to the virtues of democracy (see Russett; Oneal).
Arguments
First and foremost, it is essential to prove that politics is the allocation of resources, or else economic conditions would have no great bearing on the civility with in them, as no arguments or competition would be centered around the distribution. I do not think it an over step to say that governments, especially democratic government, form in order to meet the needs of the people unified within them. I do not think it is a gross logical leap to say that governments, and of course the decision makers within them, are the primary actors in politics. With this I will then argue that as the politics of the Jordan show, it is the job of government, even those that are not democratic, to allocate what resources they have (or desire) and that in many cases these resources are scarce. If they weren’t scarce then, people would not have to formulate a presiding structure, government or even international organizations, to allocate the resources among them. This is further reinforced by scholarly works, such as that from Bronstron and Robert. As there micro-ed example of individual organizations being categorized as political and non-political accepts the notion that resource allocation, what they call resource sharing systems, is substantial part of what defines a political organization.
Arguments against politics being the distribution of scarce resources were hard to find, which should be a statement in itself, but as this is a polemic piece I pull an argument mentioned in Downs piece. This argument follows the logic of the private-sector regulating itself, claiming that government and political action only interfere with the allocation of resources. This claim protests that the private sector manages resource distribution, and the decision behind it, so the actors in politics would have no need to become hostile or uncivil in the case that economic conditions are poor. I would refute this point as Downs does, in democracies people give authority to their government, which is conducted in a political nature, to make resource allocations, and so many sub-fields of economics are based as such. The private sector either sees benefit in giving up this power to a system allocation of what Downs calls welfare, or the private sector succumbs to public demand that its resources be shared.
My second point is that scarcity creates competition. One would be hard pressed to say that incivility is breed outside of a competitive arena. The basis for my argument is simple, if there is less to go around then people who equal seek to acquire resource will compete for it. This can be either armed conflict or negotiation. Though it is easy to identify war and armed conflict as incivility, language, and tactic in negotiation can also be identified as incivility. Admittedly, slinging curse words is not the same as sling missiles, but this does fit within the confines of the medical definition of tolerance i.e. the lack of hostility. This of course is supported by historical examples of conflict in the Jordan region over water conflict, if countries cannot all draw from rivers in harmony, then armed conflict will proceed, or dominance will be asserted in the world stage, which can be perceived as threats of assault. Though this is a broader example than that of the United States congress, I think it yet applies if scaled appropriately.
Against my argument stands the position that scarcity can create cooperation, not competition. If groups are acting cooperatively one can assume that lines have not been drawn in the sand and hostile words are not being said or hostile actions are not being committed. This would mean a more stringent definition of civility, then a lack of hostility, would have to be taken for the thesis to continue. The arguments for cooperation benefits come from Poon and Tjosvold’s literature of open-minded interaction. The support for this argument comes from the potential benefit in resource scarcity and that in combination with cooperation it could lead to more effective, and efficient resource distribution. I would say the key fault to this argument is that it could foster effective resource distribution, in the case that the powers at be do cooperate, which they are shown not to do historically or currently by the Downs literature.
Finally there is that competition, which spurs incivility, will supersede other values that could aid in retaining civility. This argument aids in tying what has been thus far a miss-match of macro-international politics examples to the mico-United States congressional level politics at hand. Economic interdependence of nations, the ability for them to operate without being overtaken in market aspects, being a large part of Oneal and Russett’s arguments for Kantian Peace between democracies supports the idea that democracies are not at some virtuous level of peacefulness that other regime types are not. This in turn supports my argument that competition supersedes other values. If a country cannot effectively contribute, and benefit a collective, it stands a greater chance of not staying at peace for much longer, and having hostility directed toward it, and directing hostility for others resources. If all countries enter such a state of economic disparity, resources will have uncivil relations taken over them. Whether that is the United States, using its superpower authority or a country using force to take resources, from a neighboring “weaker” country. Taking from that, the same could be said of any agency, or interest in the United States, and the congress people aligned with those interests.
Against my argument is the origin of Kantian Peace, the Democratic Peace Thesis. This is the sole claim that it is the virtues of democracies not to go to war with one another, because of shared values. It also asserts that it is hard to go to war in a democracy, and gaining support against a country that has leaders that are presumed to be elected legitimately is difficult (see Oneal; Russett). To refute this argument I will point out the additions made in a now more accepted version of the Kantian Peace. The first addition would be international organization, presiding to offer rules and guidance in the case of governments, and countries failure to cooperate. The second being already discussed at length, economic interdependence. If democracy and the values associated were enough to overcome incivility, and in the case of international politics armed conflict, then these additional categories wouldn’t be necessary to explain why democratic, who also happen to be the wealthiest, nations do not go to war against each other often.
Conclusion
Arguments in favor of my hypothesis hold in spite of the arguments presented against them. The process of putting counter arguments presented in current literature on the subject of civility and resource management stand as a rigorous test. I did have the luxury that much academia did not make direct attacks at my hypothesis in their works. The claim that there is a positive relationship between civility and economic conditions has a place with in both subjects of civility and resource distribution. As there is not much on the subject it was difficult to find sources that were useful to my discussion. In order to find relevant works, I had to accept fairly dated material that discussed civility or resource allocation at length. With that I think that it would be best in the future to collect data that would compare civility or perceived civility with economic conditions. It would help confirm my research, as really no such data collection exists at this time. With that I would like to again assert that following a logical flow chart, and testing it with counter point (see figure 1) there is a positive relationship between civility and economic conditions demonstrated.
References:
1. Allen, Robert, Mayes, Bronston. October 4, 1977. “Toward a Definition of Organizational Politics.” The academy of Management Review. 2(4): 672-678.
2. Ansolabehere, Stephen. 1994. “Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?” American Political Science Review 88(4):829–38
3. Downs, Anthony. April, 1957. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.” Journal of Political Economy. 65(2):135-150.
4. Lau, Richard R. 1982. “Negativity in Person Perception.” Political Behavior. 4(4):343–52
5. Lowi, Miriam. 2003. Water and Power: The politics of the scarce resource in the Jordan River basin. New York: Cambridge University Press.
6. Oneal, John, Russett, Bruce. 2001. Triangulation Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: Norton.
7. Poon, Margaret, Tjosvold, Dean. September, 1990. “Dealing with Scarce Resources: Open-Minded Interaction for Resolving Budget Conflicts.” Group Organization Management. 23(3): 237-255.
8. Skitka, Linda, Tetlock Philip. November, 1992. “Allocating Scarce Resources: A contingency model of distributive justice.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 28(6): 491-522.